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Abstract:
The long-form television drama series Hannibal (Fuller 2013–2015) thematises
the embodied imagination and the elicitation of empathy and ethical understanding
at the level of narrative and characterisation as well as through character
engagement and screen aesthetics. Using Hannibal as a case study, this research
investigates how stylistic choices frame the experiences of screen characters and
engender forms of intersubjectivity based on corporeal and cognitive routes to
empathy; in particular, it examines the capacity for screen media to facilitate what
neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese terms intercorporeality. As a constitutive aspect
of intersubjectivity and social understanding that works through embodied
simulation, intercorporeality invites a reconceptualisation of empathy and its
association with ethical motivation and insight. Hannibal also introduces
cannibalism as a dark metaphor for the incorporation of another into oneself,
reflecting on empathy’s ill-understood potential for negative affect and unethical
consequences.
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“What he has is pure empathy. He can assume your point of view, or
mine—and maybe some other points of view that scare him. It’s an
uncomfortable gift, Jack. Perception’s a tool that’s pointed on both ends.”
—Hannibal Lecter discussing Will Graham in
Hannibal (S1E1) “Ape´ritif”
As philosopher Jeanette Kennett observes, there is much to “learn about
empathy and in particular about its role in morality by studying
conditions in which it is significantly impaired” (2017, p. 364). A lack
of empathy is symptomatic of autism and psychopathy—conditions
attributed to a number of characters in showrunner Bryan Fuller’s
television series Hannibal (NBC, 2013–2015). Hannibal tells the story of
psychopathic psychiatrist Hannibal Lecter’s (Mads Mikkelsen)
cannibalistic exploits during the time that he befriends and counsels
Will Graham (Hugh Dancy), a special investigator for the FBI with an
“empathy disorder” that enables him to profile serial killers. The series is
based on characters from Thomas Harris’s novel, Red Dragon (1981),
which takes place before The Silence of the Lambs (novel by Thomas Harris
1988; film by Jonathan Demme 1991).1 The TV series attributes Graham’s
augmented capacity for empathy to several factors including a surfeit
of mirror neurons, a vivid imagination, and a psychological disorder
that includes symptoms of Asperger’s syndrome, such as avoiding eye
contact and experiencing awkwardness with social interaction, although
autism-spectrum disorders usually inhibit empathy. In Hannibal’s
exaggerated representations of the multiple valences of empathic states
and in its dramatization of empathic processes, the television series helps
us understand more clearly how the complex phenomena of empathy and
ethical insight may be elicited.
The analysis that follows is guided by two central questions. First, how
do cognitive and corporeal modes of empathic engagement relate to ideas
about the embodied imagination,2 interaffectivity, and intercorporeality?
1. The characters in Fuller’s Hannibal also feature in two other films based on Red
Dragon: Manhunter (Michael Mann, 1986) and Red Dragon (Brett Ratner, 2002).
Anthony Hopkins also plays the eponymous character in director Ridley Scott’s
Hannibal (2001).
2. The term “embodied imagination” is borrowed from phenomenological film theorist
Vivian Sobchack’s essay “Is Any Body Home? Embodied Imagination and Visible
Evictions” (2004). Sobchack uses the term as a synonym for the bodily imagination,
which she describes in ways related to proprioception and the “subjective, lived feeling
of our material being” (2004, p.192). My use of the term here encompasses the
subjective feeling of one’s own embodied knowledge but extends to the bodily
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Second, what roles might ethical evaluation and televisual narration play
in these interconnected processes of empathising, feeling, and imagining?
As detailed below, I approach empathy as a way of feeling into another’s
subjectivity in what phenomenologist Dan Zahavi refers to as a form of
“knowledge by acquaintance” that produces experiential understanding
of another person’s “embodied mind” (2014, p. 151).
Einfu¨hlung: Ethical Understanding and the Intelligence of Emotions
Empathy plays a central role in the ways in which people engage with
narrative and visual arts and develop an understanding of the interiority
and emotions of others, hence it has special importance in both the study
of ethics and the study of film and television. While empathy is not an
emotion in its own right, it is closely associated with the role of emotion as
an index of value and with what philosopher Martha Nussbaum terms
“the intelligence of emotions,” which forms “part and parcel of the system
of ethical reasoning” (2001, p. 1). I discuss both the positive and negative
potential of empathy and its complicated relationship to emotion and
morality in what follows; however, empathy and emotion are considered
by many to be connected to what moral philosopher Heidi Maibom
identifies as the prosocial, altruistic aspects of ethical judgment and
motivation (2014, pp. 28–38). In cinema studies, philosopher Robert
Sinnerbrink has advanced an appreciation of “cinempathy” to consider
film as a medium of ethical experience, describing the “dynamic
movement between the poles of empathy and sympathy as a
cinempathy: a cinematic/kinetic expression of the synergy between
affective attunement, emotional engagement and moral evaluation that
captures more fully the ethical potential of the cinematic experience”
(2016, p. 80). Scholarly attention has only recently begun to focus on
empathy and emotion in television studies, yet despite the awkward fit of
the neologism, Sinnerbrink’s concept of cinempathy can be extended to
apply to television. In Emotions and Contemporary TV Series, Alejandro
Martinez and Ana Gonzalez point out that “the fact that emotions unveil
our values as well as our position in the larger social structure makes them
an important source of self-knowledge and also knowledge about the
world” (2016, p. 13). Martinez and Gonzalez go on to suggest that
long-form television drama fosters what they call “embodied judgments”
and that “these types of narratives inspire emotion and reflection” (2016,
p. 13). I aim to demonstrate that television narratives such as Hannibal do
more than inspire emotion, they facilitate both affective and cognitive
imagining of and other-oriented responses to how others feel, which is more closely
associated with intercorporeality than interoception or proprioception.
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modes of empathy and invite reflection on empathy’s mechanisms and its
ethical effects.
The history of the term empathy is well documented as originating in
German aesthetics where the concept of Einfu¨hlung was introduced by art
historian Robert Vischer in 1873 before being adopted by psychologist
Theodor Lipps (1903) and translated into English as “empathy” by
Edward Titchener in 1909. Thereafter empathy was taken up in the
hermeneutic and phenomenological traditions to refer to projecting
oneself into or “feeling into” artworks or other people’s subjective
experience in a manner that produces experiential understanding.
Zahavi’s phenomenological account provides a useful point of entry for
thinking about empathy in relation to film and television. He argues that
empathy is a form of “expressive understanding” of the embodied mind of
another person that “allows for a distinct experiential grasp of and access
to the other’s psychological life” (Zahavi, 2017, p. 42). While there is
much debate about how narrowly to define empathy, most scholars agree
that it encompasses both involuntary neurophysiological responses
(affective empathy or embodied simulation) and volitional acts of
cognition (perspective taking, mind-reading, or mentalising). Zahavi’s
working definition therefore captures important aspects of empathic
responses to screen media including cognitive processes such as
imagination as well as feelings that may be shared with screen characters.
In “Empathy, Mind and Morals,” Alvin Goldman contends that
empathy is important both to philosophy of mind and moral theory due
to its capacity to offer insight into the mental and emotional states of
others, to facilitate mutual understanding of motives and emotions, to
enhance the ability to predict behaviour, and thus to “promote mutual aid
and inhibit injurious behaviour” (1992, p. 35). Psychologist Martin
Hoffman’s influential work on empathy and moral development examines
the contribution of empathy to altruism, compassion, concern for others,
moral judgment, caring, and justice in terms of empathy’s prosocial
functions (2000; see also Hamington, 2015). The analysis of Hannibal to
follow in no way undermines this important work in moral philosophy
and moral psychology, but it does demonstrate the capacity of complex,
long-form narratives to reveal the intricacies and contradictions that may
inflect the way empathy functions in artworks and in human interactions
and challenging ethical scenarios.
Narrative and Aesthetic Evocations of Empathy
Building on the foundations of research in moral psychology and
philosophy, humanities scholars find that perceptual processes and
reactions to aesthetic qualities and cues are also central to eliciting
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empathy in the narrative arts because the experience of empathy in
literature or film recruits the emotive, imaginative, and interpretive
abilities we use when attuning ourselves to others in relational ethical
deliberation (see John, 2017, p. 315). According to literary theorist
Suzanne Keen, narrative empathy involves perspective-taking and
vicariously sharing feelings that can be evoked by seeing, hearing about,
reading about, or imagining another person’s story and their inner state
(2007, p. 4). From the perspective of film studies, Alastair Fox argues any
response to a work of fictive representation involves an “intersubjective
transaction” that includes sharing attention, intentions, and emotions
(Fox, 2016, p. 163). In narrative fiction, the reader or audience’s attention
is focused and shared through “the selection and arrangement of plot
elements and in strategies of enunciation such as narrative perspective,
framing, control of distance, and timing” (Fox, 2016, p. 163). Intentions
are shared through alternations in audio-visual point of view and shifts in
focalisation that characterise narratives and are often signaled by voice-
over narration, flashbacks or other subjective coding in film and television
sequences (Fox, 2016, p. 164). Fox goes on to claim that sharing affective
states is facilitated by “conceptual metaphor, the arrangement of montage
elements, the construction of plot shape, and the use of tone, especially as
these inhere to the intrinsic affective structures of genres”—and these
elements work together to foster “interaffectivity” (2016, p. 164). In these
ways screen media narratives provide access to both cognitive-imaginative
and affective-experiential forms of empathy because audiences are able to
perceptually share in the sights and sounds of protagonists’ internal and
external worlds and to mirror characters’ emotional facial expressions
and gestures. Whereas other forms of narrative fiction such as literature
may primarily facilitate cognitive empathy, film and television also elicit
what I will term “affective transfer.” Without getting entangled in
neuroscientific terminology from the literature on empathy’s relationship
to theory of mind or mirror neurons and embodied simulation, affective
transfer points to the ways in which stylistic techniques may facilitate
corporeal empathy by directing the audience’s attention to screen
characters’ affective experience.
Narrative, with its cause and effect logic, is fundamental to organising
human understanding of selfhood, behaviour, and events (Ricoeur, 1991).
In screen narratives more specifically, the codes and conventions of
continuity editing and the grammar of cinematography also inform the
way we think and these techniques and conventions are at the same time
structured by the way humans perceive, experience and understand
the world. The shot-reverse-shot structure and the technique of pulling
focus, where the audience may take the position of first the listener, and
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then the speaker in a conversation are examples of this. In Emotions in
Contemporary TV Series, Alberto Garcia argues TV offers a type of
narrative distinguished by its “textual duration” and “a stronger
familiarity with the characters, which in turn influences the degree of
sympathy that spectators feel towards them; this can even affect the moral
judgments placed upon their actions” (2016, p. 7). In the same collection
of essays, Robin Nelson claims that affect is a “structuring principle” in
long-form serial television watching, which involves “a process of
dynamic interplay between feeling and cognition mobilized by textual
complexity” (2016, p. 30). From these conventional techniques of
narrative television through to the abstract and subjective imagery in
the third season of Hannibal, the television series attunes its audience to
perspective sharing and empathic experience.
Describing empathy as a complex moral ability closely linked to both
imagination and compassion, Nussbaum argues that the narrative arts play
a significant role in fostering ethical capabilities:
Narrative imagination is an essential preparation for moral interaction.
Habits of empathy and conjecture conduce to a certain type of citizenship
and a certain form of community: one that cultivates a sympathetic
responsiveness to another’s needs, and understands the way circumstances
shape those needs. (2008, p.148–9)
Imagination, as Nussbaum uses the term here, is a form of ethical
attunement or attention to others’ stories and inner states. Hannibal is a
series that takes imagination, its connection to empathy and social
cognition, and its ethical consequences seriously. This is most evident in
the character of Will Graham, empath and criminal profiler, but the
capacity for empathy is also central to the television audience’s experience
of narrative imagination and responsiveness. Here again, imagination and
empathy may have both positive and negative ethical considerations as
concerns about the audience being “seduced” by Lecter’s sharp intellect
and cultured antihero status suggest (see Bainbridge, 2015).
From Imaginative Insight to Incorporation: Cognitive Empathy and
Affective Transfer
When FBI Chief Jack Crawford (Laurence Fishburne) asks Graham in
the pilot episode if he “can empathise with narcissists and sociopaths,”
Graham replies, “I can empathise with anybody. It’s less to do with
a personality disorder than an act of imagination.” Crawford later
tells Graham, “I want to use your imagination,” although he recognises
that Graham deals with “huge amounts of fear” that “comes with
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his imagination.” This recognises that emotion and imagination
are inextricably linked and work together during empathy. Graham
himself describes empathy as an act of imagination, which is represented
televisually as reconstructing crimes in first person point of view, in
reverse. But it is an embodied, affective form of imagining that
requires immersion and emplacement and that has a powerful physical
effect on Graham, leaving him sweating and gasping, pierced by
headaches, shaking, and beset by nightmares. Empathy is also
represented in the series as a form of extra-sensory perception or
insight, a form of mind reading – Graham removes his glasses when he
empathises in order to see past the lenses and barriers that separate self
from other.
The affective force of the embodied imagination is also vividly
represented in the series when, for example, Graham realises that the
serial killer he is profiling is eating his victims. He takes this knowledge in
through his own body as though he, too, has ingested human flesh and his
feeling of horrified disgust becomes palpable to and may be mirrored by
the audience. Disgust, as Angela Ndalianis argues with reference to
Lecter’s cannibalism, is a corporeal form of insight that “invades the
body” (2015, p. 282) and “disgust-arousing art also relies on a response of
intense viscerality that is somatically ‘grounded’” (2015, p. 283). Much
research into the fear of invasion associated with disgust emphasises how
disgust evolved to guard against the ingestion of contaminants to ensure
that the body isn’t polluted. See, for example, Carl Plantinga’s work on the
relationship between physical disgust and sociomoral disgust (2006) and
Julian Hanich’s account of the aesthetics of disgust (2009). While
cannibalism provokes disgust in Graham – a “sociomoral” reaction that
is meant to be shared by the audience – the television series
simultaneously problematises empathy and forms of identification or
“fusion” that are overly visceral and proximal by thematically linking
empathy to incorporation and thus to cannibalism. As structural
anthropologist Claude Le´vi-Strauss provocatively states in his essay “We
Are All Cannibals,” “Jean-Jacques Rousseau saw the origin of social life in
the sentiment that impels us to identify with others. And after all, the most
simple means to identify others with oneself is to eat them” (2016, p. 88).
Through this complex aesthetic and narrative evocation of disgust and the
theme of cannibalistic incorporation, the television series explicitly invites
its audience and its characters to consider themselves and their own
bodily relationships to empathic feelings, sensory perception, and
imagination. In doing so Hannibal also problematises the loss of clear




The aesthetic techniques used in the TV series indicate salient features
of the experience of empathy itself. In the opening sequence of the
pilot episode, the experience of empathy is communicated via a slow
zoom into Graham’s face and a pendulum swinging back and forth,
suggesting a hypnotic state as it audibly swooshes through the air with
the rhythm of a heartbeat or pulse and the optical impression of eyes
blinking closed. The heartbeat and pulse suggest inner sight and the sepia
filter and zshoomp sound indicates a movement back in time. These close,
augmented sensory connections are integral to empathy and the embodied
insight that it brings, suggesting that it is not just a cognitive appraisal
based on the evidence at hand. Empathy offers a different, experiential
way of knowing. Shallow focus is used in conjunction with close ups
to isolate the human face from the background and lock attention onto
it, augmenting the sense that Graham has a unique ability to connect
almost completely with others and yet he is alone in and separate from
the world.
By foregrounding the role of imagination in constructing and inhabiting
another person’s reality, the series positions cognitive empathy as crucial
to Graham’s professional and personal life, yet it also suggests that acute
empathy results in a painful emotional overload that may impede social
engagement. Neurocinematic research points to the ways in which
aesthetic choices and screen technologies function to construct the
experiences of television characters and invite the audience to inhabit the
subjective realms of screen characters. Hannibal exemplifies how
television’s long-running character arcs afford the opportunity to
establish intersubjective insight and foster perceptual attunement, yet
the use of cannibalism as a trope for the empathic incorporation of
another into oneself also exposes empathy’s negative potential and
perceived dangers of screen media spectatorship.
Mirror Neurons and Intercorporeality
The aesthetic cues and televisual techniques in Hannibal foster what
neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese terms “intercorporeality,” which is a
form of embodied simulation facilitated by mirror neurons (2014). In
Gallese’s view, intercorporeality is a constitutive aspect of intersubjectivity
that is central to social understanding because it offers a primary source
of pre-reflective knowledge of other people’s behaviour, goals, and inner
states by direct simulation of that person’s own affective, bodily
experience. Near the end of the first season (episode 10, “Buffet Froid”)
Lecter informs Crawford: “The problem Will has is too many mirror
neurons. Our heads are filled with them when we are children.
They’re supposed to help us socialise and then melt away, but Will held
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onto his, which makes knowing who he is a challenge.” In this same
episode, Crawford tells Graham: “What you do is you take all of the
evidence available at a crime scene. You extrapolate. You reconstruct
the thinking of a killer. You don’t think of yourself as the killer.” Graham,
who is at the time suffering undiagnosed anti-NMDA receptor
encephalitis, replies: “I got lost in the reconstruction,” implying that in
the experience of empathy he may in fact “get lost” in the identity,
emotions, motives, and mental processes of the killer he is profiling.
Gallese is one of the scientists credited with the discovery of mirror
neurons and the study of their activation in film spectatorship and he has
shown that mirror neurons are active when we perform, perceive, or
imagine goal-directed action (2014; 2016). Thus, mirror neurons and the
affective mimicry they produce can be understood as a form of embodied
imagination – an intercorporeal engagement with another subject rather
than a loss of self. The mirror neuron mechanism has been referred to as
the biological underpinning of empathy because it provides a kind of
direct embodied knowledge of other people’s actions and objectives.
Fellow neuroscientist Marco Iacoboni goes so far as to claim that
neural mirroring facilitates social and altruistic conduct by making
intersubjectivity possible (2009, p. 666).
Acoustic and visual close-ups are two powerful ways that film and
television can activate mirroring responses, facilitate intersubjectivity, and
elicit visceral, somatic responses in the audience. Although the term
empathy is not used explicitly, as early as 1924 when he published Visible
Man, Be´la Bala´zs championed the expressive potential of the body and
particularly close-ups of the face in cinema. Bala´zs claimed that when
confronted by the physiognomy of the human face magnified in close up
on screen, “we see emotions and thoughts” (2010, p. 100): in observing
gestures and facial expressions the human subject’s feelings and intentions
not only become visible but also palpable. With the advent of
synchronized sound, Bala´zs developed his embodied, sensory approach
to film by identifying acoustic close-ups in which “subtle associations
and interrelations of thoughts and emotions can be conveyed by means
of very low, soft sound effects” (1952, pp. 210–211) as an emotive
technique unique to cinema—unavailable to literary works or stage
performances. Bala´zs introduced ideas about the empathic qualities of
close-up cinematography and sound design that have had a lasting
influence on phenomenological film theory and cognitivist studies of facial
feedback.
In Hannibal, we find evidence of Gallese’s concept of intercorporeality
and Bala´zs’s ideas at work not only in expressive facial close-ups but in
extreme close-ups of body cavities such as an opera singer’s epiglottis and
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mouth and Lecter’s ears and nose, which create a connection to the
television viewer’s own body and sensory perception. For example, in the
opera scene in season 1 episode 7 “Sorbet” the camera emerges from deep
within the windpipe of the diva’s throat, moving through the vibrations of
her moist, pink flesh as she sings. Amidst breathy, bodily sucking sounds
that underscore the aria, the camera withdraws, moving out of her open
mouth with the beautiful music to reveal her face and body; it then roves
through the audience to find Lecter before rotating inward through his
ear as he appreciates the music, moving into the darkness of his mind.
Top light obscures access to the expression in Lecter’s eyes in this scene,
as it does in much of the series, but the soundscape draws the audience
deep into the characters’ inner worlds. In many scenes, the soundscape of
the series is awash with disturbing undercurrents of metallic and
mechanical sounds mixed with organic, bodily noises like a throbbing
pulse, a drumming heartbeat, and buzzing, pounding, headache sounds.
A bull roarer is used to create the guttural sound of the man-stag beast that
stalks Graham in his dreams and hallucinations and the cinematographer
attempts to give the audience a visceral sense of Graham’s instability by
attaching a Claremont image shaker to the camera lens to lend a corporeal
vibration to the image. These aesthetic techniques foreground the
materiality and subjectivity of the screen characters ’ experiences and
create a kind of affective transfer for the audience. Writing about the
significance of sound in the elicitation of cinematic empathy, Mark Ward
contends that: “cinema recruits our body’s innate capacity for ‘ feeling
into ’ another’s affective state, offering an embodied and noncognitive
route to empathy, even if that other is fictional… cinematic sound design
is an embodied process of experiential knowing” (2015, pp. 185–186).
Bala´zs’s theory of imaginative engagement with the aesthetic
representations of the face suggests that acting and other aspects of
cinematic or televisual style including cinematography and sound provide
insight into human subjectivity by revealing the emotions of characters
and effacing the boundaries separating the self from others. Subsequently,
researchers have built on Bala´zs’s work to further understanding of how
screen aesthetics elicit empathy by cultivating emotional perception
and social understanding. For example, Plantinga analyses “scenes of
empathy,” which are narrative sequences that show the audience
close-ups of a film character’s face to reveal “interior emotional
experience,” ensuring that the character’s emotional life “becomes the
locus of attention” (1999, p. 239). In scenes of empathy, the character’s
perceptual experience is typically privileged through a shot-reverse-shot
sequence that reveals what the character is looking at, followed by
close-up reaction shots that show their response. Human physiognomy is
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hard-wired into perception so that it looms large on our attentional
register (Davidson, 2012, p. 9), which is why intimate close-ups of Lecter
and Graham throughout the television series draw viewers in so
effectively.
Empathy’s Negative Potential
Despite its capacity to facilitate ethical insight or altruistic behaviour,
there are several distinct ways in which empathy may also have troubling
effects. These include the potentially negative consequences of
empathising with flawed or dangerous characters, using empathic
insight to do harm, or having an aversive reaction to the vicarious
experience of others’ pain.
Screen media, and particularly film or television narratives that have a
strong visceral charge and that invite a degree of identification with
violent, sadistic, or evil characters, often give rise to concerns about
emotional contagion, imitation, and an erosion of the distinction between
self and other dating back to early understandings of empathy. Lipps,
whose concept of empathy encompassed aesthetic appreciation and
the problem of other minds, claimed that to feel Einfu¨hlung is to be
“transported” into another subject, object, or artwork and in the process
to experience a sense of interconnection so that “the distinction between
the self and the object disappears” (Lipps, 1903, p. 253). This concern
about empathic “fusion” remains contentious in contemporary debates
about empathy’s meaning and its relationship to film spectatorship,
intersubjectivity, and ethics.
As the analysis of Hannibal has demonstrated, the aesthetic design of
film and television texts can intensify empathy and the narrative arts play
an important cultural role by extending the range of people and
experiences that an individual may have occasion to empathise with, as
cognitive film theorist Murray Smith points out (see Smith, 1995; 2011).
However, empathy is not necessarily linked to prosocial behaviour. Ed
Tan, like many cognitive film scholars and affective neuroscientists, argues
that there is an evolutionary advantage to understanding and predicting
other people’s feelings and actions and that faces and eyes receive most
attention by audiences and in everyday social interaction (2013, p. 347).
This finely attuned perception is what makes Lecter a successful higher
order predator and Graham an adept criminal profiler.
When profiling killers, Graham experiences dissociative episodes and
his empathy disorder overwhelms him to the extent that Lecter says: “I’m
worried about you, Will. You empathise so completely with the killers
Jack Crawford has your mind wrapped around that you lose yourself to
them.” This loss of the self or loss of boundaries around the self is a
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concern often expressed about empathy and about film and television. For
instance, Tan suggests that, as audience members, we often involuntarily
“lose ourselves” in screen characters (2013, pp. 337–8) when identifying
strongly with a protagonist and mirroring their emotional state. In a more
extreme formulation of the “fusion of subjectivities” claim, Adriano
D’Aloia states: “the total assimilation of subjectivities stems from viewers
losing self-awareness and fusing their egos with that of the character”
(2015, p. 189). Even in a fictional case like Graham’s empathy disorder, it
is not possible for empathic experience to bring about “total assimilation
of subjectivities” or a “fusion of selves” (Raz and Hendler, 2014, p. 97)
either in everyday life or in relation to film and television characters—and
if it were possible, such merging would not constitute empathy. As Zahavi
explains:
Rather than blurring the distinction between self and other, rather than
leading to some sense of merged personal identities […], the asymmetry
between self-experience and other–experience is quite crucial for empathy.
(2017, p. 39)
Joshua May’s work on intersubjectivity critically examines the extent
to which empathic fusion or merging with another subject might occur.
May debunks the fears and suppositions of those who overstate the
empathic fusion hypothesis and egoists who argue that “empathy blurs
the distinction between self and other such that one may in some sense be
concerned with oneself” (2017, p. 472), citing numerous empirical
studies that show “empathy typically leads to altruistic concern for
others” (2017, p. 468). Philosophers such as Nussbaum who are sceptical
about the extent to which empathic fusion is possible argue that empathy
is more akin to “the mental preparation of a skilled (Method) actor: it
involves a participatory enactment of the situation of the sufferer, but is
always combined with the awareness that one is not oneself the sufferer”
(2001, p. 327, qtd in May, 2017, p. 475). Ultimately, scholars like Zahavi,
May, and Nussbaum offer persuasive accounts of empathy that allow for
intersubjective insight into others’ perspectives and experiences in
everyday life and in the narratives of film, television, or literature
without entailing fusion with another subject by way of contagious
thoughts or feelings that are taken up as one’s own.
Notwithstanding implausible fears about empathy’s sinister capacity to
lead to a loss of self, the inability to “feel with” or “feel into” another
person’s subjective experience is far more of a concern. Like Graham,
Lecter is acutely perceptive, but he uses his insights in ways that are
far from altruistic. Lecter says to Graham, “Observing is what we do.
I can’t shut mine off any more than you can shut yours off.” Yet Lecter is
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being disingenuous here, for he has an unusual capacity to shut off
empathy.
Alison Denham observes in her study of empathy and moral motivation:
It is widely believed that psychopaths exhibit deficits in affective
empathy; indeed, ‘ lack of empathy ’ is among the disorder’s diagnostic
criteria. This is supported by behavioural observations as well as autonomic
measures such as skin-conductance and startle-blink responses. (2017,
p. 236)
A study led by neuroscientist Harma Meffert indicates psychopaths aren’t
incapable of empathy – they just excel at blocking the amygdala’s capacity
to inhibit aggressive behaviour by associating it with feelings of the
victim’s pain and fear (Meffert et al., 2013, p. 2559). In other words,
psychopaths can experience “cold empathy” or insight into other people’s
experience without actually feeling for or caring about them. Uncoupling
empathy from emotional alignment or feelings of ethical concern goes
some way to explaining Hannibal’s chilling combination of cultured
charm and callousness as psychopaths typically exhibit a “failure to
integrate affective and cognitive information” (Denham, 2017, p. 237).
Tan’s perspective on how screen aesthetics can cue intentional empathy
or “mind reading” approaches the idea of “cold empathy” when he
maintains that “empathy does not always result in an emotion” and that
empathy is “a cognitive state resulting from efforts to understand another
person” (2013, p. 339, 340). Similarly, philosopher Amy Coplan denies
that involuntary mirroring or affective resonance qualify as empathy and
instead favours a cool, deliberate mode of empathy that is often described
by cognitivists as involving higher order cognitive processes. Coplan
argues that imagining oneself in another person’s situation results in
self-oriented perspective taking, which she views as “pseudo-empathy”;
by contrast, “empathy proper” involves other-oriented perspective taking
that maintains distinct boundaries between self and other (2011, p. 58).
In Coplan’s view, affective matching is one of empathy’s necessary
conditions; however, neither involuntary emotional contagion nor
self-oriented perspective taking are conducive to the ethical benefits of
“empathy proper” because they are not other-directed and can lead to
misapprehensions about interpersonal similarity or result in aversive
reactions such as being overwhelmed by one’s own negative affect (2011,
p. 57). By this definition, Graham’s first-person imagining of criminal
subjectivity and his strong aversive reaction to that experience would be
termed pseudo-empathy—self-oriented feelings denuded of ethical value.
However, taking a different perspective from Coplan and revisiting
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Martinez and Gonzalez’s work on television and embodied judgments,
one could argue that Graham’s affective response is an embodied ethical
judgment. In experiencing personal distress as a result of empathising
with murderers, Graham not only gains imaginative insight into their
actions and motives, he judges them to be morally abhorrent through a
cognitive act of evaluation and also through a deeply felt, corporeal value
judgment.
The Embodied Imagination: Social Cognition and Ethical Insight
As Gallese argues, intercorporeality or embodied knowledge based on
mirror mechanisms (what I have referred to as affective transfer) is
a primary source of our knowledge of others and our capacity for
empathic understanding (2014, p. 4). This view of intersubjectivity
and identity is grounded in the concept of the embodied self. Gallese
claims that the discovery of mirror neurons led to a reconceptualisation
of intersubjectivity in terms of an intercorporeal form of social
cognition based on “the mutual resonance of intentionally meaningful
sensorimotor behaviours” (Gallese, 2016, p. 302). When he states that
“intercorporeality becomes the primordial source of knowledge that we
have of others,” Gallese means that empathic understanding of others’
agency and intentionality depends on a kind of social intelligence derived
from observing bodily actions, gestures and expressions that resonate in
our own body (Gallese, 2016, p. 302; see also Gallese, 2014, p. 7). Here
Gallese shows that empathy cannot be reduced to a physiological level or
to an act of cognition. Rather, as D’Aloia contends, “it is a feeling
composed of different levels, namely perceptual, emotive and cognitive,
grounded in the lived-body” (D’Aloia, 2012, p. 101). This reinforces
claims that intercorporeality and interaffectivity are foundational
components of empathy:
Primary empathy as mediated by embodied interaction may subsequently be
extended by higher-level cognitive capacities such as perspective-taking and
imaginary transposition. Nevertheless, intercorporeality and interaffectivity
remain the basis of social cognition. (Fuchs, 2016, p. 196)
Film and television texts, especially those that are aesthetically and
emotively rich, are designed to make audiences watch closely and
become attuned to the expressive faces and forms on screen, thus screen
media and spectatorship are as valuable as any laboratory or medical
imaging device in studying the experience of empathy. Indeed, Patricia
Pisters’ astute analysis of another television serial killer, Dexter, shows
that contemporary neuroscience emphasises “the signifi-cant role of
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embodiment in any kind of processes of the brain,” therefore, “the
classic division between mind/cognition versus body/phenomenological
experience” now needs to be “rethought in new and perhaps more
productive ways” (2014, pp. 58–59). Film and television can play a role in
engendering empathy and intersubjective understanding because as
viewers tune in to their subjective responses and observe the expressive
performances on screen, the screen engages the embodied imagination by
focusing attention on information that the body and the senses
communicate about oneself and other people. Joel Krueger claims that
because facial expressions, posture and gestures often reveal aspects of a
person’s mental and emotional state, it follows that ethical sensitivity can
be developed “by paying careful attention to and responding to the bodily
dynamics that underwrite our lived encounters with other people.
Heightened perceptual attunement breeds deeper forms of responsive
empathy” (2009, p. 691). Thus, the role of the body and particularly the
face in displaying and mimicking emotions and facial expressions,
postures, and gestures makes subjective states available to others in
ways that may activate the altruistic potential of empathy and its moral
dimensions.
This analysis of Hannibal has furthered the argument that film and
television have an important place in the narrative arts because the
aesthetic and technical audio-visual strategies by which screen media
represent experience can also reproduce a protagonist’s perceptual
experience, stimulating both the imaginative and the affective
components of empathy. The characterisation and aesthetic techniques
of Hannibal illuminate different modes and understandings of empathy as
well as enabling us to work through fears and concerns about the potential
for both empathy and film and television to overwhelm a person by
infecting them with a contagious form of subjectivity, as expressed in
metaphors of fusion, incorporation, and cannibalism. I hope to have
shown that intercorporeality is not a dangerous loss of self or an unethical
act, but an integral component of empathy that normally facilitates
social insight and interaction and that is fostered by screen media.
Hannibal illustrates the significance of audio-visual media and their
capacity to engage viewers with characters’ subjective experiences
through the use of close-ups, performance techniques, cinematography,
sound design, and sustained character identification over many hours
of screen time and narrative immersion. The television series Hannibal
affords an understanding of the importance of screen aesthetics
and empathy’s positive and negative valences, while opening up
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